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An overview of current concerns in the regulation of offshore pipelines is presented along with
tabulated summaries of pipeline failure causes, failure prevention techniques, and pipeline
monitoring and early intervention techniques. A database of over 1000 offshore pipeline
failures in the Gulf of Mexico Offshore waters has been compiled from combined records of
the Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Coast Guard National
Response Center, and the Department of Interior Minerals Management Service. The data has
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The objectives of this research were to:
1. Characterize current concerns about pipeline structural integrity assessment and regulation.
2. Introduce a matrix summarizing pipeline failure mechanisms, the controlling factors for
each mechanism, methods used to prevent damage, and methods used to mitigate damage or
provide early detection/intervention.
3. Introduce an outline of current internal inspection technologies, pipeline surveying
technologies, and pipeline monitoring systems.
4. Develop a first generation "user-friendly" public database on personal computer software of
marine pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf Area compiled from
combined data from the Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety, the U. S.
Coast Guard National Response Center, and the Department of Interior Minerals Management
Service.
5. Provide an informal, qualitative review of the information on pipeline failures available
from the regulating authorities.
6. Provide recommendations for future data collection and organization.
7. Present some initial summaries of trends in pipeline failures versus year of failure, month of
failure, nominal diameter of pipeline, age, and burial status.

n. Current Concerns Regarding Offshore Pipeline Regulation




A substantial percentage of the OCS pipeline infrastructure is approaching or operating
beyond its design life.
2. Pipeline companies are under high pressure to keep pipelines in service because of high
costs of replacement and, in some cases, because of difficulties with the permitting of
replacements.
3. The current system of pipeline regulation is not very well coordinated in terms of outlining
the specific responsibilities, jurisdictions, and functions of the different agencies. The
maintenance of records on existing pipelines is especially in need of improvement.
4. Because of multiple jurisdiction and because trunk lines are often used by multiple
operators, it is sometimes difficult to determine who is using a particular pipeline and who has
jurisdictional authority.
5. Existing federal safety regulations for gas and liquids transmission pipelines require
hydrostatic testing of pipeline segments before initial operation and after relocation, however,
pipeline operators are not required to retest pipelines after they are in operation. (U.S. DOT
1983 Sections 192.503 and 195.302) Legislation has been proposed in Congress to mandate the
use of internal inspection devices (intelligent pigs) but currently federal regulations are silent
on this issue.
6. After several recent fatal accidents in which fishing vessels have struck exposed pipelines,
Public Law 101-599 (commonly referred to as HR 4888) was passed in November of 1990.
This law requires pipeline operators in the Gulf of Mexico to inspect all pipelines between
Mean High Water and 15 feet below Mean Low Water to determine if they are exposed and if
they pose a hazard to navigation.

m. TABULATED SUMMARY OF OFFSHORE PIPELINE FAILURE MECHANISMS AND
Strategies for Their Prevention
The following matrix of offshore pipeline failure mechanisms provides an overview of all the
different factors which can lead to the failure of an offshore pipeline. This matrix was
developed with the intent of providing an efficient introduction to offshore pipeline failure
mechanisms for those who are not currently familiar with this subject and to provide a
convenient organization of data for those who are already familiar with this subject and wish to
expand upon the chart for their own use. The matrix lists the following information for each
failure mechanism:
FAILURE MECHANISM/ PROCESS: The force, action, or phenomenon which leads to the
failure of an offshore pipeline. With few exceptions, these are the failure mechanisms
represented in the offshore pipeline failure database which has been prepared with this report.
FUNCTION OF: This category describes the physical, quantifiable characteristics of the
environment that are factors in determining whether or not a failure will occur. These factors
are important not only in the design of the pipeline, but also in a retrospective analysis of
historical failures. These items should be the focus of any data collection on historical pipeline
failures, since they can be used to directly correlate pipeline failure to specific parameters of
the environment. More recommendations on this subject will be made in Section VII of this
report.
AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES: This category describes procedures that can be used to
prevent failures by the mechanism being described. Methods that can employed on both new
and existing pipelines have been listed.
PREDICTION/INSPECTION/EARLY INTERVENTION/ SPILL MITIGATION:
This category describes methods that a pipeline operator can employ to manage existing
pipelines as part of a well coordinated Inspection/Maintenance/Monitoring/Repair Program. It
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rv. A Review of Internal Inspection Techniques (Intelligent Pigs)
The innovation in the area of the internal inspection of pipelines over the last twenty years has
been nothing short of amazing. Within the next ten or twenty years it may be possible by
running an electronic device (intelligent pig) inside an in-service pipeline to provide a
relatively complete analysis of its condition including:
* accurate surveying data, along with indications of spanning
* the condition of its weight coating,
* the location and size of internal and external defects,
* the presence of any leaks,
* the condition of internal coatings and the effectiveness of the corrosion
prevention program.
Obviously, large economic incentives exist for further research in this area. A note of interest
is that the Battelle Columbus Division in Columbus, Ohio is working under the auspices of the
Gas Research Institute to build an independent research center for testing and development in
this area. The project was projected to be completed this year and its goal is to work with both
pipeline operators and vendors of in-line inspection technology to evaluate existing systems,
make improvements, and develop new concepts.
The following matrix of internal inspection tools and techniques provides a survey of proposed
and existing technologies in this area. The information has been tabulated after a thorough
search of many articles in the literature on this subject. It is difficult to come up with objective
data on this subject since many of the reports available are written by the proponents of a
specific idea. In some cases, it is difficult to determine from reading the article if the technique
is actually available or whether it is in the early stages of development. Where specifications
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V. An Overview of Pipeline Surveying Systems
Pipeline surveying is important to provide accurate data on the locations of pipelines for
charting, conducting offshore operations in the vicinity of pipelines, identifying pipeline
spanning problems, and for back calculating stresses based on changes in the configuration of
the pipeline. Especially in shallow waters, pipeline surveying is required to verify that
pipelines remain buried in spite of coastal erosion and other changes in the morphology of the
seabed. The passage of Public Law 101-599 (commonly referred to as HR 4888) which
requires pipeline operators in the Gulf of Mexico to inspect all pipelines between Mean High
Water and 15 feet below Mean Low Water to determine if they are exposed and if they pose a
hazard to navigation has brought a lot of attention and innovation to this area of pipeline
monitoring and maintenance.
In general, the two methods of pipeline surveying are:
Transverse Surveying (spot surveying) - instruments are towed across the pipeline at
predetermined intervals to fix its location at these points.
Longitudinal Surveying (continuous surveying) - instruments are towed over the
pipeline along its length to provide continuous fixes
The following table provides a summary of some of the deep and shallow water pipeline
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VI. An Overview of Pipeline external inspection & Monitoring Systems
Besides the internal inspection techniques previously presented, there are many techniques for
the external inspection of pipelines. These devices are presented in this section together with






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































vn. Pipeline Failure Database
A. Benefits of Maintaining Historical Failure Information
1
.
Provides operators and regulators with a tool to assess the overall effectiveness of their
efforts.
2. Provides an indication of trends in failures which may require further investigation.
3. Could be used by pipeline operators and designers to provide statistical data for use in
decision making
4. Could provide more information for investigations of failure mechanisms which cannot yet
be analytically modelled
B. Objectives of This Database
1 Provide an historical record of pipeline failures that can be used to improve current offshore
pipeline design, operation, and maintenance.
2. Demonstrate the value of a database of failures.
3. Indicate the type of failure information currently available through regulating agencies.
4. Identify different sources of pipeline failure data.
5. Highlight areas in current data collection that may be lacking.
6. Provide initial data for a possible study into designing a comprehensive approach to data
collection which is coordinated among all pipeline regulating organizations.
7. Present the database in a "user-friendly" status along with sufficient information on its
organization so that it can be easily accessed and maintained.
26

C. Approach Taken in Compiling the Database
1
.
Every attempt was made to maintain all of the quantitative data fields applicable to a study
of offshore pipeline failures that were available from each source of failure reports.
2. An attempt was made to combine information from as many different sources as possible.
3. The source of each failure record was maintained separately so that a comparison of the
records maintained by each agency could be made.
4. Some judgement and assumption had to be applied in interpreting incomplete failure
reports. This was done only where there was a rather high degree of confidence about what the
report was attempting to state.
5. Where multiple reports of the same failure were encountered and there were discrepancies
between the reports, the most detailed or the most current account was assumed to be the most
accurate.
6. Only reports of leaks from gas, crude, or condensate lines were included in the database.
Reports of lube oil leaks, diesel, etc. from offshore production equipment were discarded since
this report makes no attempt to address failures on platforms( except for risers).
D. The Organization of the Database
1. After a review of the data collected, a decision was made to compile only the data from the
Gulf of Mexico Federal OCS Region. This decision was made for the following reasons:
a. there was not enough time allotted for this report to compile all of the information
collected
b. the system of block descriptions and block numbers used in the Gulf of Mexico OCS
Region make it easy to recognize this information
c. this represents the bulk of information collected
d. the Gulf of Mexico data has been used in several other studies that can be used for
comparison with this study
27

e. all of the different sources of information had data on the Gulf of Mexico, whereas
only one source of information provided significant numbers of data on other
areas
2. Data was collected from a total of four different sources. The fact that the organization of
the data from each source was different presented some difficulties in structuring a single
database. In order to maintain the maximum amount of information from each source and in
order to facilitate updating of the database, an approach was chosen whereby a separate
database was first compiled for each source and then a master database with all the fields from
each of the databases represented was compiled by combining all the individual databases.
After the separate databases were combined, a manual screening for duplicates was made to
produce a single record with all the information from the different sources.
The master database was named PIPELINE.DBF. A listing of all of the fields contained in this
database along with their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
E. Sources of Data
1. Department of Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS):
a. Gas Pipelines-For gas transmission lines and gas gathering systems governed by
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 191.5 and 191.15, failures meeting
any of the following criteria must be reported to the Department of Transportation on their
form RSPA 7100.2(3-84) "Incident Report - Gas Transmission and Gathering Systems":
a)results in death or personal injury requiring hospitalization,
b)results in any segment of a transmission line being taken out of service,
c)causes gas to ignite,
d)results in property or product loss in excess of $50,000 (prior to 1984, the
property loss threshold for reporting was $5,000.), or
e)is significant in the judgement of the operator even though it did not meet the
specified criteria.
A total of 77 incident reports on offshore gas pipelines from the period 9/9/84-7/7/90 were
received from the OPS for this report. The information was provided in the form of copies of
28

actual reports. The number of reports received for each year were as follows: 1984(6);
1985(14); 1986(6); 1987(11); 1988(11); 1989(19); 1990(10). All but one of the incidents were
in the Gulf of Mexico. The one exceptional report was in California. An example of a Gas
Transmission and Gathering System Incident Report is shown in Appendix A. The report
provides by far the most useful information of any of the data collected, however, the
threshold for reporting of $50,000 filters out all but the largest failures. The data from these
reports were organized into a separate database named GASLIST.DBF prior to placing them
into the combined database. A listing of all of the fields contained in this database along with
their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
b. Liquid Pipelines- For liquid pipelines governed by Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Parts 195.50, failures meeting any of the following criteria must be
reported to the Department of Transportation on their form DOT 7000-1 "Accident Report -
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline":
a)results in death or bodily harm,
b)results in an explosion or fire not intentionally set by the carrier,
c)results in an escape to the atmosphere of more than 5 barrels a day of highly
volatile liquids,
d)results in property damage to a second party of $1,000 or more, or
e)results in property damage to the carrier of $5,000 or more.
A total of 12 accident reports for offshore liquids pipelines from the period 12/20/85-7/26/90
were received from the OPS for this report. This information was also provided in the form of
copies of actual reports. The number of reports received for each year were as follows:
1985(1); 1986(2); 1987(1); 1988(3); 1989(4); 1990(3). All but one of the incidents were in the
Gulf of Mexico. The exception was in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.
An example of a Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Report is shown in Appendix A. The
report is similar in detail to the Gas Incident Report. The data from these reports were
organized into a separate database named LIQLIST.DBF prior to placing them into the
combined database. A listing of all of the fields contained in this database along with their
descriptions is given in Appendix B.
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2. Department of Interior Minerals Management Service Data:
The MMS provided its complete current listing of pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico
which consists of 826 incidents during the period from 8/27/67 to 10/26/90. This represents by
far the largest single source of failure data on the Gulf of Mexico found in the preparation of
this report. The data is kept in a typewritten tabular format and apparently has not been placed
into a database except by some other researchers doing work in this area. Unfortunately none
of these electronic listings were available for this report, so this data was also manually entered
into the database. An example page from the data kept by the MMS is included in Appendix
A. A second source of MMS information on pipeline failures was provided in OCS Report
MMS 88-0011 "Accidents Associated With Oil & Gas Operations-Outer Continental Shelf
1956-1986". The information in this report was compared with that given in the tabular listing
of failures and the most complete version of the information was put in the database.
The MMS also provided a printout of its electronic database inventory of pipelines in the Gulf
of Mexico OCS Region which provides a segment number along with information on pipeline
diameter, age, length, status, burial, and ownership for approximately 19,000 miles of GOM
OCS pipelines. An example page of this information is included in Appendix A.
For each failure in the MMS data an attempt was made to manually look up the segment in the
pipeline inventory to identify the segment number, the length, the construction date, and the
burial code. This information was added to the failure information and compiled into a
separate database named RMMSDATA.DBF and then combined into the master database. A
listing of all of the fields contained in this database along with their descriptions is given in
Appendix B.
3. U. S. Department of Transportation, U. S. Coast Guard, National Response
Center(NRC):
A request was made to the NRC under the Freedom of Information Act for "all data recorded
for all pipeline failures occurring offshore back to 1982"(which was when the NRC began
collecting data). The Coast Guard offered the option of delivering this information on
magnetic tape or as printed material. Printed material was chosen since the data was to be
inputted into a PC versus a main frame computer. The Coast Guard responded with 881
records from the period of January 1982 to October 1991 . Of this data 206 reports could be
identified as occurring in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region from the block description and
30

block numbers used in the description of the location of the accident. This data was the last to
be inputted into the master database and it is interesting to note that 154 of these accidents
were not included in the data from either the DOT or the MMS. The rest of the data was from
the following areas. This information is provided because it gives an indication of the scope of
the problem of pipeline failures in internal waters of the United States and it might give some
indication of the completeness of the records being received at the NRC. Please note that these
figures include all failures regardless of the commodity spilled, much of which is refined
products:
Texas: 136 reports, mostly from state waters, bays, and bayous of the Gulf of Mexico
Louisiana: 375 reports, mostly from state waters, bays, and bayous of the Gulf of
Mexico
Mississippi: 8 reports, all from bays and bayous of the Gulf of Mexico
Alabama: 1 report from state waters of the Gulf of Mexico
Florida: 4 reports









West Virginia: 1 report
New Jersey: 4 reports
Maine: 2 reports
Puerto Rico: 5 reports
Virgin Islands: 4 reports
The NRC data from the Gulf of Mexico was compiled into a separate database named
NRCINFO.DBF and then combined into the master database. A listing of all of the fields
contained in this database along with their descriptions is given in Appendix B.
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4. Failure Data From Literature:
Reports of 46 different pipeline failures were taken from an article written by M.D. Reifel
entitled "Storm Related Damage to Pipelines, Gulf of Mexico" which was published in
Pipelines in Adverse Environments. ASCE, New York, N. Y. 1978. These records were
entered directly into the master database and identified by the number 1 in the REF (reference)
field. Information from other sources in the literature on this subject could be readily added in
a similar manner.
5. Failure Data From State Agencies:
No information from state agencies were include in the database. The State Lands Commission
of California was very helpful in providing a computer printout of 22 failures over the period
from November 1980 to August 1989 but this was after a decision had been made to
concentrate on Gulf of Mexico OCS information. This data has been saved along with all the
other raw information. Representatives of other state agencies ( the Texas Railroad
Commission and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources) who were contacted
telephonically at the beginning of this project indicated that the information collected by the
Department of Transportation OPS was indicative of almost all pipeline failures in their states.
From a review of the data received from the NRC, it is apparent that many failures occur
which are below the DOT thresholds and therefore are not included in DOT records. Further
efforts toward collecting state records might be of interest to help further define the scope of
failures in non-federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
7. Failure Data From Pipeline Operators:
No information from pipeline operators was collected. A future effort towards collecting such
data or, "at least, soliciting input on the data collected to date is recommended.
8. Failure Data from Non-Petroleum Related Sources:
No information from non-petroleum related sources (e.g. commercial fishing organizations and
environmental protection organizations) was collected. There was no verification that such




F. Highlights of the Database
1. The database was compiled on Fox Software, Incorporated 's Foxpro Software. The program
offers pull-down menus, it is compatible for use with a mouse, and it is relatively easy to learn
and use.
2. A total of 1047 records of pipeline failures in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region from
2/27/67 to 10/9/91 have been compiled.
3. The data is comprised of records from the sources described previously as follows:
DOT Data: 89 records from 9/9/84 to 7/26/90
MMS Data: 826 records from 2/27/67 to 10/26/90
NRC Data: 206 records from 1/11/82 to 10/9/91
REF1 Data: 43 records from 2/27/67 to 7/5/78
During the 5 */2 year period from 1/1/85 to 6/30/90, reports from DOT, MMS, and NRC are
all represented. This period, since it is the most well represented, provides the best overall
data for studying trends of total failures. A separate database covering this period was
compiled and named STUDY.DBF for convenience in doing further analyses.
4. A unique feature of the database report is the fact that it contains information on the age,
length, and burial of pipeline segments that was collected from the MMS inventory. The
numbers of records with this information are relatively small since it was difficult to identify
pipeline segments, in many cases, from the information provided on failure reports.There are
enough records, however, to provide some insight or verification of how these factors effect
failure rates.
5. A diskette containing all of the databases is provided in Appendix G.
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VEL Initial Analyses of the Data and Recommendations for Future Analysis
A. Tabulated Summaries of Data
The following summaries of the database are provided on the following pages:
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year pg. 35
Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year pg. 36
All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Year pg. 37
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month pg. 38
Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month pg. 39
All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Month pg. 40
Gas Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter pg. 41
Oil Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter pg. 42
All Pipeline Incidents - Failure Mechanism Per Nominal Diameter pg. 43
Corrosion Failure Versus Pipeline Age pg. 44
Failure Mechanism Versus Burial pg. 44
These tables are representative of some of the information available on the database and of the
types of data that can be analyzed. A summary of trends identified from these and other
analyses is presented on page 45.
Printouts of condensed versions of the database sorted chronologically and by block number
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B. Summary of Trends Identified from Initial Analyses:
1
.
An offshore pipeline failure occurs in the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region every five days. This
figure is based on the period of data which was represented by the most sources of failure
records.
2. A separate pipeline failure occurs approximately every six days in state waters, bays, and
bayous of the Gulf of Mexico. This figure is based on information from the National Response
Center and includes refined products.
3. The number of total failures (GOM OCS) has been fairly constant over the last ten years.
The average is 59 failures with a standard deviation of 1 8 failures based on a normal
distribution.
4. The numbers of failures due to internal corrosion have increased markedly in the last five
years.
5. The numbers of failures at flanges has increased (presumably as their use has become more
common). The only recorded failures for the largest pipelines (36" diam.) occurred at flanges.
Weld failures have remained very low in spite of the increased total inventory of pipelines over
the years.
6. Corrosion seemed to show up as a failure mechanism in pipelines of around 10 years of age
or in pipelines over 20 years old. This variability is likely a function of the diligence of the
operator's corrosion prevention program.
7. 40 of 52 pipelines damaged by storms for which burial information was available were not
buried or surface mounted(risers). This would appear to support an assumption that burial of
pipelines on the average provides better protection from both hydrodynamic or geotechnical/
hydrodynamic forces, however, the decision to undergo the expense of burying a pipeline
should be made on a case by case basis. This decision should include options of applying the
money saved from not burying the pipeline to other programs for avoiding and mitigating
failures.
8. Visual techniques are the most common means of detecting pipeline failures. This
information was collected for 16 failures. One leak was detected by an ROV, the others were
observed from the air or from a platform.
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vm. Recommendations for Future Data Collection
These recommendations are made based on the following premises:
1
.
Collection of failure reports is required to ensure adequate operation and regulation
of offshore pipelines.
2. If data is to be collected, it should be of sufficient detail and completeness to provide
for a retrospective analysis of trends and correlations between failure rate and
characteristics of the environment, the pipeline type and configuration, and
operator performance.
3. Reporting should be streamlined so as not to overburden either operators or
regulators.
Recommendations:
1. The DOT, MMS, and NRC should agree on a specific format for offshore pipeline failure
reports. These reports should preferably be uniquely designed and maintained for offshore
pipelines. Further, if they have not done so already, the regulators should create a system so
that this information can be shared among agencies and among pipeline operators. A central
electronic database and electronic reporting formats would greatly facilitate this process.
2. A coordinated approach to identifying pipeline segments similiar to the system used in the
MMS inventory should be developed between regulators and operators.
3. Methods of identifying geographical locations similar to the Gulf of Mexico OCS Region
block description and block numbers should be instituted for other regions.
4. A review of the quantifiable characteristics of the pipeline operating environment presented
in Section HI of this report will facilitate development of agreements between regulators and
operators on the information to be collected.
5. Failure reports should be verified for completeness and accuracy prior to their acceptance.
Forms designed specifically for offshore pipelines and increased involvement by operators in
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Appendix A: Sample Data Sheets:
Samples of incident reports from the following sources are included:
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS)
Incident Report - Gas Transmission and Gathering System.... pgs. 50 and 51
Accident Report - Hazardous Liquid Pipeline pgs. 52 and 53
Department of Interior, Minerals Management Service (MMS)
Table of Pipeline Failures in Gulf of Mexico OCS Region .... pg. 54
Pipeline Inventory for Gulf of Mexico OCS Region pg. 55
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a.., v a -o, „cMa S200 OOP „ pVov.oeo^ dTJscVst'b'" ^ OMsCmTos
O
Oeseorcn ond Special Proqronu
Admim\frotion
INCIDENT REPORT - GAS TRANSMISSION AND GATHERING SYSTEMS ° *s?a,
— r..' - iJwjc-.
PART 1 - GENERAL REPORT INFORMATION
'Skt /\STKlCTlO\S'
1 a Operator s 5 digit identification no
4 5
o Mame ot Operator ANR Pipeline Company
500 Renaissance Center
Number
Number and Stree60 nrj t
etroit, Michigan 48243
Number /
Oty. County. State and Zip Code
2. Location of incident
a
Eugene Island Block 266
City and County
b Offshore Louisiana, Federal Waters,
State and Zip Code Gulf of Mexico
c Mile Post- Valve Stat X = 1.881,731.5 6




Onshore G 1 2 C 3 D 4
Offshore E Eugene Island Block 266
area block number
State or Outer Continental Shelf **
Estimated S 63,000
4 Reason for Reporting
D Fatality





5 Elapsed time until area was made safe
/ / / hr / / / mn
6 Telephonic Report
I
/ 3 , mo 13/ day 9 , yr





t incident on Federal Land other than Outer Continental Shelf
G Yes S No
3. Incdent Type
— Leak Rupture Other
Rupture Length ,teeti
b Maximum allowable operating pressure IMAUP) (PSIG) 1250
c MAOP established by.
(PS/Ci(II Test pressure 2683
12) 49CFR §192.619UM3> G
8 Time and Date of the Incident
1 6 3 5 hour 3 mo ,1.2 day /9 yr
CST
PART 2 - APPARENT CAUSE
H Corrosion
'C •mrmue in Kj/ r I /
Damage by Outside Forces Construction Mater, d i Defect Otr
'C"c -ntinue in Parr Bl 'Continue in P>n r C
i
PART 3 - NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE INCIDENT (Attach additional sheens, as necessary,
PART 4 - ORIGIN OF THE INCIDENT
1 Incdent Occurred On
(3 Transmission System fj Gathering System
D Transmission Line of Distribution System
2 Failure Occurred On
C8 Body of P.pe Q Fitting, Specify
Mechanical Joint Other, Specify
D Vaive D Weld. Specify
(girth, longitudinal, fillet)
3 Material Involved:
S Steel D Other. Specify
4 Part of System Involved in Incident
a Part
3 Pipeline Regulator/Metering System
Compressor Station Other
b Year installed /l /9 / 7 / 0/
PART 5 - MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
1 Nominal Pipe Si/e
2 Wai; Thickness
3 Specification API-5LX
4 Seam Type ERW
5. Valve. Type
0'l/2/ ,n
0-3 75 . ,n
smys /4/6/ 0/0/0 /
6 Manufactured oy American Steel
, n year 19 7/0 ,
PART 7 - PREPARER AND AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE







Donald E. Cross. C.S.&P.
r\pe nr print) Prepare' ^ \o" - ••-a T e
313 / 496-2460
Te ephone Number
Author zed SiCn dtU re and Di:
(313) / 496-1 51;
Telephone Nu^'be*
Forrr, RCPA F 71C0 2 (J-84'
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1 Where did corrosion occur 7
S Internally
Externally
4 Pipe Coating Information
Bare H Coated
5. Was corroded part of pipeline considered to be under cathodic protection prior to discovering incident 7










Primary Cause of Incident
D Damage resulted from action of operator or his agent
Damage resulted from action by outside oarty/third party





2. Locating information (for damage resulting from action of outside party/ third party)
a. Did operator get prior notification that equipment would be used in the area?
D Yes Date received III mo / / / day / / / yr
No
b Was pipeline location marked either as a result of notification or by markers already in place'
Yes Specify type of marking
No









D Construction Material (describe in C.4 below)
2. Description of Component Other than Pipe
3 Latest- Test Data
a Was part wrtiich leaked pressure tested before incident occurred?
Yes Date of Test / / / mo / / / day / / / yr
D No
b. Test Medium D Water Gas D Other
c. Time held at test pressure / / / hr
















.) Name of operator
2.) Principal business address
ARCD Pipe T.inp Tympany
ARCO Building







PART B—TIME AND LOCATION OF ACCIDENT
1.) Date: (month) December
2.) Hour (24 hour clock) 150Q
(day) 20 (year) 1935
3.) If onshore give State (including Puerto Rico and Washington, DC).
and county or city.
4.) if offshore, give offshore coordinates
_. South Eaaa Blnck ^ v = ?
,
7sn,iaT
, y = LIU&53
5.) Did accident occur on Federal Land? tf yes (^hp n
(See instructions for definition of Federal Land.) f*' ' i
6.) Specific location (If location is near offshore platforms, buildings, or other landmarks, such as highways, waterways or
railroads, attach a sketch or drawing showing relationshp of accident location to these landmarks)
Approx. 750 feet southeast pj Sftnfh Pass R1nrk fin P1a , f_ „r „ „ ^ ^ _ f
PART C-ORIGIN OF RELEASE OF LIQUID OR VAPOR.
1) Part of system involved:
IS line pipe tank farm O pump station
2.) Item Involved: a pipe valve D scraper trap pump
D welding fitting D girth weld tank
D bolted fitting D longitudial weld
Other (specify)
(Check all applicable items)
3.) Year item installed 1973
PART D—CAUSE OF ACCIDENT
D corrosion failed weld D incorrect operation by operator personnel
failed pipe outside force damage
malfunction of control or relief equipment.
(J other (specify) Buckled due to TTnknn^n r» enn^
PART E—DEATH OR INJURY |
1
.) Number of person* kiH#d.
Operator employees





PART F-ESTIMATED TOTAL PROPERTY DAMAGE ~ "
$ None to outside parties -- only a sheen on the water resulted from this leak.
PART G—COMMODITY SPILLED
r.ruJ* Oil1( Name of commodity spilled:
2.) Classification of commodity spilled:
D Petroleum Petroleum product HVL or E Non-HVL
3.) Estimated amount of commodity involved
3_ Barrels spilled Barrels recoverd
4.) Was there an explosion?
yes E no




PART H—OCCURRED IN LINE PIPE
6"
1.) Nominal diameter (inches)
3.) SMYS (psi) 15,00 04.) Type of joint: CXwelded
5.) Pipe was CX Below ground D Above ground
6.) Maximum operating pressure (psig) 1440
7. Pressure at time and location of accident (psig) 400
8.) Had there been a pressure test on system?
C2 yes no
9.) Duration of test (hrs) §
10.) Maximum test pressure (psig) 18Q1
1 1
.) Date of latest test 7-3-83
2.) Wall thickness (inches) . 144"
L_ flanged C threaded
(submerged)
coupled C other







3. Facilty under cathodic protection?
yes D no
4. Type of corrosion
galvanic G other (Specify)
PART J—CAUSED BY OUTSIDE FORCE
1 . D Damage by operator or its contractor
n Damage by others









Other Unknown at this time
Was a damage prevention program in effect
JS yes no
If yes, was the program
"One-Call" C Other AOCC Anchor Pr^pH„r fl
Did excavator call? N/A
D yes D no
Was pipeline location temporarily marked for the excavator?
yes no n/A
PART K—ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT
On Friday, ^December 20, 1985, at approximately 3:00 P.M., a sheen was detected on
surface cf the water approximately 750 feet southeast of South Pass Block 60 "C"
Platform. Investigation by divers revealed a buckle in the pipeline. A seepage




NAME AND TITLE OF OPERATOR OFFICIAL FILING THIS REPORT
/S>C#%2*e&>' V. P. DrlaH. Regional Manager
lih- -m-ivm 1-13-8S
Telephone no. (Including area code) Date
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Appendix B: Database Field Descriptions:
Descriptions of the fields used in the following database are provided:
PIPELINE.DBF (Master database of all recorded failures) pgs. 57 and 58
GASLIST.DBF (DOT Gas Pipeline Incident Reports) pgs. 59 and 60
LIQLIST.DBF (DOT Liquid Pipeline Incident Reports) pg. 61
RMMSDATA.DBF (MMS Pipeline Incident Records) pg. 62
NRCINFO.DBF (NRC Database Pipeline Incident Reports) pg. 63
56

The database "PIPELINE.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC
REF C 3
MMS INFO L 1
DOT INFO L 1
OP_ID_NO C 5
OPNAME C 40
OP STREET c 40
OPCITY c 20





MP_VLV STA C 20
SURVSTA C 40
BLOCK DESC C 3
BLOCK NUMB C 5
PLATFORM C 3
LOC MEMO M 10
INCTYPE C 10
RUP LENGTH c 10
NOFATAL N 3
NO INJ N 3
AMT DAMAGE N 8
EXPLOSION L 1
FIRE L 1




TEST PRESS N 4
CFR L 1
INC_TIME C 4
INC DATE D 8




POL_BBLS N 8 1
SYS TYPE C 30
SYS PART C 30
PARTDAM c 10
PLINE PART c 40
PLINEMATL c 10
PIPE SIZE N 2
PIPE WALL N 4
PIPE_SPEC c 20
PIPE SEAM c 20
DESCRIPTION
DESCRIBES SOURCE OF INFORMATION
DESCRIBES SOURCE OF INFORMATION











SURVEY STATION OR LAT. AND LONG.
TWO LETTER ABBR. FOR GOM BLOCK NAME
GOM BLOCK NUMBER
PLATFORM DESIGNATION
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATION
TYPE OF INCIDENT:LEAK, RUPTURE OR OTHER
LENGTH OF RUPTURE IN FEET
NUMBER OF FATALITIES
NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED
ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGE
LOGICAL:WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?
LOGICAL:WAS THERE A FIRE?
EST. TIME UNTIL AREA MADE SAFE
DATE OF TELEPHONIC REPORT
PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT (PSIG)
MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE (PSIG)
TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP (PSIG)




APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENT
PRODUCT TRANSPORTED
SERVICE CLASSIFICATION PER MMS INVENTORY
CLASSIFICATION OF COMMODITY SPILLED
POLLUTION IN BARRELS
SYSTEM TYPE: GATHERING, TRANSMISSION,ETC
PART OF SYSTEM: PIPELINE, METER,ETC
PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGED
SPECIFIC PART FAILED: WELD, FITTING, ETC
PIPELINE MATERIAL
NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
WALL THICKNESS x 10"4
































MAX DEPTH N 4
TYPE OF PIPE JOINTS USED
AGE OF PART FAILED
AGE OF PIPELINE
PIPE MANUFACTURER
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON PART FAILED
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE FILING REPORT
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBER
LOCATION OF CORROSION: INTERNAL,
EXTERNAL
VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF CORROSION
CAUSE OF CORROSION
LOGICAL: WAS PIPELINE COATED?
LOGICAL: WAS CATHODIC PROTECTION USED?
YEAR CATHODIC PROTECTION STARTED
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSION
CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY OUTSIDE FORCES
AMPLIFYING INFO ON DAMAGE
CAUSE OF CONST OR MATERIAL DEFECT
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CONST OR MATL DEFECT
OTHER CAUSE DESCRIPTION
AMPLIFYING INFO ON OTHER CAUSE
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSE
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSE
MMS SEGMENT NUMBER
LENGTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT PER MMS
INVENTORY
DATE PIPLEINE CONSTRUCTED PER MMS
INVENTORY
BURIED
METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTED
MAXIMUM DEPTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT
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The database "GASL1ST.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC
DOTJNFO L 1
OP ID NO C 5
OP_NAME C 40
OP STREET C 40
OP_CITY C 20
OP STATE C 2
OP~ZIP C 5
INC STATE C 2
MP VLV STA C 20
SURVSTA C 40




RUP LENGTH C 10
NO FATAL N 3
NO_INJ N 3
AMT DAMAGE N 8




TEST PRESS N 4
CFR L 1
INC TIME C 4









PIPE SPEC C 20
PIPE SEAM C 20
PART AGE N 2
PIPEAGE N 2
PIPE_MANUF C 20
MATL MEMO M 10
PREPARER C 20
PREP PHON C 12
DESCRIPTION







STATE IN WHICH INCIDENT OCCURRED
MILE POST/VALVE STATION
SURVEY STATION OR LAT. AND LONG.
GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCK
GOM: BLOCK NUMBER
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATION
TYPE OF INCIDENT:LEAK.RUPTURE OR OTHER
LENGTH OF RUPTURE IN FEET
NUMBER OF FATALITIES
NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED
ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGE
EST. TIME UNTIL AREA MADE SAFE
DATE OF TELEPHONIC REPORT
PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT(PSIG)
MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE(PSIG)
TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP(PSIG)
LOGICAL: MAOP ESTABLISHED BY 49 CFR 192.619
TIME OF INCIDENT
DATE OF INCIDENT
APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENT
PRODUCT TRANSPORTED. E.G. GAS
SYSTEM TYPE: GATHERING, TRANSMISSION




NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
WALL THICKNESSX10'4 INCHES
PIPE SPECIFICATION AND SMYS
SEAM TYPE
AGE OF PART FAILED
AGE OF PIPELINE
PIPE MANUFACTURER
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON PART FAILED
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBER
Continued on next page.
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Organization of GASLIST.DBF continued:















LOCATION OF CORROSION: INTERNAL, EXTERNAL
VISUAL DESCRIPTION OF CORROSION
CAUSE OF CORROSION
LOGICAL: WAS PIPELINE COATED?
LOGICAL:WAS PART CATHODICALLY PROTECTED?
YEAR CATH. PROTECTION STARTED (01/01/YEAR)
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSION
CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY OUTSIDE FORCES
AMPLIFYING INFO ON DAMAGE
CAUSE OF CONSTRUCTION OR MATERIAL DEFECT
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CONST OR MATL DEFECT
OTHER CAUSE DESCRIPTION
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON OTHER CAUSE
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The database "LIQLIST.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC
DOT INFO L 1
OP IDNO C 5
OP_NAME C 40
OP STREET c 40
OP CITY c 20
OP_STATE c 2
OP ZIP c 5
INTERSTATE L 1
INC DATE D 8









PIPE AGE N 2
AP CAUSE C 20
NO FATAL N 3
NOINJ N 3
AMT DAMAGE N 8
PRODUCT C 10
CLASSIFICA C 10
POL_BBLS N 7 1
EXPLOSION L 1
FIRE L 1
PIPE SIZE N 2
PIPE_WALL N 4
PIPE SPEC C 20
JOINT_TYPE C 10
MAOP N 4





CORR CAUSE C 20
CORR_MEMO M 10
DAM_CAUSE C 30
DAM MEMO M 10
DETECTION C 10
PREPARER C 20
PREP PHONE C 12
DESCRIPTION










GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCK
COM: BLOCK NUMBER
SURVEY STA OF LAT AND LONG
LOGICAL: FEDERAL JURISDICTION?
AMPLIFYING INFORMATION ON LOCATION
PART OF SYSTEM INVOLVED: LINEPIPE, ETC.
SPECIFIC PART FAILED:VALVE,WELD,ETC.
AGE OF PART FAILED
AGE OF PIPELINE
APPARENT CAUSE OF INCIDENT
NUMBER OF FATALITIES
NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED
ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGE
PRODUCT TRANSPORTED
CLASSIFICATION OF COMMODITY SPILLED
POLLUTION IN BARRELS
LOGICAL: WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?
LOGICAL: WAS THERE A FIRE?
NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
WALL THICKNES X 10*4 INCHES
PIPE SPECIFICATION AND SMYS
TYPE OF PIPE JOINTS USED
MAX. ALLOWABLE OPERATING PRESSURE(PSIG)
PRESS. AT POINT AND TIME OF INCIDENT(PSIG)
TEST PRESS. USED TO ESTABLISH MAOP (PSIG)
LOCATION OF CORROSION: INT. OR EXTERNAL
LOGICAL: WAS THE PIPELINE COATED?
LOGICAL: WAS CATHODIC PROTECTION USED?
CAUSE OF CORROSION
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CORROSION
CAUSE OF DAMAGE BY EXTERNAL FORCES
AMPLIFYING INFO ON CAUSE OF DAMAGE
METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTED
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE
OPERATOR REPRESENTATIVE PHONE NUMBER
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The database "RMMSDATA.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC
MMSJNFO L 1
INC DATE D 8
POL_BBLS N 8 1
OP NAME C 20











PART DAM C 10
DESCRIPTION




NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
SERVICE CLASSIFICATION PER MMS INVENTORY
GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCK
GOM: BLOCK NUMBER
PLATFORM DESIGNATION (IF ON PLATFORM )
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSE
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSE
MMS SEGMENT NUMBER
LENGTH OF PIPE SEGMENT PER MMS INVENTORY
DATE PIPELINE CONSTRUCTED
BURIED?:YES(Y),NO(N),SURFACE(S)
PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGED
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The database "NRdNFO.DBF" is organized as follows:
FIELD TYPE WIDTH DEC
NRC INFO L 1






AMT DAMAGE N 8
EXPLOSION L 1
FIRE L 1
INC TIME C 4
INC DATE D 8
SERVICE C 10
POLBBLS N 8 1
PART_DAM C 10
PIPE SIZE N 2
CAUSE 1 C 10
CAUSE2 C 10
DETECTION c 10
MAX DEPTH N 4
DESCRIPTION
DESCRIBES SOURCE IN MASTER DATABASE
NAME OF OPERATOR
GOM: 2 LETTER ABBREV. FOR BLOCK
GOM: BLOCK NUMBER
PLATFORM DESIGNATION (IF ON PLATFORM )
NUMBER OF FATALITIES
NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED
ESTIMATED PROPERTY DAMAGE
LOGICAL: WAS THERE AN EXPLOSION?
LOGICAL: WAS THERE A FIRE?
TIME OF INCIDENT
DATE OF INCIDENT
TYPE OF SERVICE (PRODUCT)
POLLUTION IN BARRELS
PART OF SYSTEM DAMAGED
NOMINAL DIAMETER OF PIPELINE
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY CAUSE
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY CAUSE
METHOD BY WHICH LEAK WAS DETECTED
MAXIMUM DEPTH OF PIPELINE SEGMENT
63

Appendix Ct Key To Abbreviations in Database
Causes of failures: Data Fields CAUSE1 and CAUSE2:
CATEGORY ABBREVIATION DESCRIPTION
UNKNOWN
UNK CAUSE STATED AS "UNKNOWN" ON REPORT
NOT GIVEN






















DAMAGE BY ANCHOR FROM ANY VESSEL
DAMAGE BY ANCHOR KNOWN TO BE FROM A
WORKBOAT
(ALSO NET)-DAMAGE BY FISHING TRAWL OR
NET
(ALSO JACKUPBARG/LIFT BOAT/ FIELDBOAT)
DAMAGE FROM ONE OF THESE VESSELS
(ALSO FOREIGN OBJECT)-UNKNOWN OBJECT
ON SEAFLOOR
(ALSO JETSLED)-DAMAGE BY JETSLED
WORKING ON NEARBY PIPELINE
DAMAGE BY DREDGE
CAUSE STATED AS "EXTERNAL FORCE" W/
NO FURTHER DESCRIPTION
DAMAGE FROM PIPELINE RUBBING AGAINST
OBJECT
DAMAGE FROM CONSTRUCTION (NO
FURTHER EXPLANATION GIVEN)
DAMAGE BY FREIGHTER STRIKING
PLATFORM











FAILURE DUE TO FATIGUE
GEOTECHNICAL
























MISALIGNED OR FAILED GASKET
FAILURE OF WELD
LEAK AT VALVE
LEAK AT CLAMP OR PREVIOUS REPAIR
LEAK AT UNSPECIFIED FITTING
LEAK AT PIPE SEAM
LEAK AT UNSPECIFIED "JOINT"1






(ALSO PIGGING)PIG STUCK OR LEAK
DEVELOPED DURING PIGGING









































2101 L. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202)457-7000
API Pipeline Committee-Des & Const
Chairman: John Moore, Exxon (713)656-5829
Vice Chairman: Andy Dakis, Chevron (415)842-6961
API Pipeline Committee-Op & Maint
Chairman: Larry Clynch, Conoco (405)767-6352
American Society of Civil Engineers
290 Temple Street
Long Beach, CA 90803
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
United Engineering Center
345 East 47 Street
New York, NY 10017
(212)644-7722
American Welding Society
2501 NW Seventh Street
Miami, FL 33125
(305)642-7090
Army Corps of Engineers
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Association of Oil Pipelines






California Dept of Conservation
State of California
Department of Conservation
Division of Oil and Gas
1416 Ninth Street, Room 1310
Sacremento, CA 95814
(916)445-9686
California Dept of Conservation(Field Offices)
-District One(Long Beach)-(2 13)590-53 11
-District Two(Ventura)-(805)654-4761
-District Three(Santa Maria)-(805)937-7246
California Dept of Transportation
(916)445-2201
California Seismics Safety Council
(916)322-4917
California State Fire Marshall
(818)937-7246
California State Lands Commission
245 West Broadway, Suite 425















Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(202)586-5000
Dept of Transportation
Office of Pipeline Safety











Institute of French Petroleum
Bureau Veritos
Louisiana Office of Conservation
La. Dept of Natural Resources
P.O. Box 94275














National Technical Information Service
(800)553-NTIS
National Transportation Safety Board
Charles Batten, Chief,(202)382-0760
Offshore Magazine
Oil and Gas Journal
(918)835-3161







Pipeline and Gas Journal

















World Offshore Accident Database
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